Data sharing is a critical component in a blockchain traceability platform. Therefore, creating a reasonable incentive mechanism to ensure that all enterprises participate in data sharing is vital for blockchain platforms. Currently, many researchers employ evolutionary game theory to analyze problems related to data sharing. However, evolutionary game theory typically assumes that the population composed of enterprises is mixed uniformly. Enterprises in the manufacturing industry are not uniformly mixed, as they tend to have specific connections with each other due to the size of enterprises and volume of business. Therefore, a networked evolutionary game is introduced to solve this problem. Firstly, an incentive model for enterprises sharing data is established. Then, a scale-free network is employed to simulate the connections between enterprises. To comprehensively consider the individual and group benefits of enterprises in the game, this study designs a strategy update rule for networked evolutionary game based on Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization and Variable Neighborhood Descent algorithm. To tackle the challenge of determining reasonable incentive values in networked evolutionary games, this study proposes a dynamic incentive mechanism based on the Q-Learning algorithm. Finally, the experiments indicate that this method can successfully facilitate the stable involvement of enterprises in data sharing.

Ruihan Liu

Category	Quartile
工程技术	3
工程技术, 工程工业	4
工程技术, 运筹学与管理科学	4

A dynamic incentive mechanism for data sharing in manufacturing industry

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Journal Info

Category	Quartile
OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE	3