In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The sender’s utility depends solely on whether or not the receiver takes the action. The receiver’s utility depends on both the action and the sender’s private information. We study three natural variations. First, we consider the problem of computing an equilibrium of the game without commitment power. Second, we consider a persuasion variant, where the sender commits to a signaling scheme and the receiver, after seeing the evidence, takes the action or not. Third, we study a delegation variant, where the receiver first commits to taking the action if being presented certain evidence, and the sender presents evidence to maximize the probability the action is taken. We study these variants through the computational lens, and give hardness results, optimal approximation algorithms, and polynomial-time algorithms for special cases. Among our results is an approximation algorithm that rounds a semidefinite program that might be of independent interest, since, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first such approximation algorithm in algorithmic economics.

Martin Hoefer

Pasin Manurangsi

Alexandros Psomas

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following:    Agents in networks  Algorithmic game theory  Computation of equilibria  Computational social choice  Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy")  Design and analysis of electronic markets  Economics of computational advertising  Electronic commerce  Learning in games and markets  Mechanism design  Paid search auctions  Privacy  Recommendation / reputation / trust systems  Systems resilient against malicious agents.

The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that explore the intersection of computer science and economics. The journal is interested in topics relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to: agents in networks, algorithmic game theory, computation of equilibria, computational social choice, the cost of strategic behavior and decentralization ("price of anarchy"), design and analysis of electronic markets, economics of computational advertising, electronic commerce, learning in games and markets, mechanism design, paid search auctions, privacy, recommendation/reputation/trust systems, and systems resilient against malicious agents.

《ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation》欢迎提交高质量的论文，探讨计算机科学与经济学的交叉领域。期刊关注的主题包括但不限于：网络中的代理、算法博弈论、均衡计算、计算社会选择、战略行为和去中心化的成本（"无序价格"）、电子市场的设计与分析、计算广告的经济学、电子商务、游戏与市场中的学习、机制设计、付费搜索拍卖、隐私、推荐/声誉/信任系统，以及抵御恶意代理的系统。

Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence

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Journal Info

Category	Quartile
COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS	4