Bipartite-matching markets pair agents on one side of a market with agents, items, or contracts on the opposing side. Prior work addresses online bipartite-matching markets, where agents arrive over time and are dynamically matched to a known set of disposable resources. In this article, we propose a new model, Online Matching with (offline) Reusable Resources under Known Adversarial Distributions ( OM-RR-KAD ) , in which resources on the offline side are reusable instead of disposable; that is, once matched, resources become available again at some point in the future. We show that our model is tractable by presenting an LP-based non-adaptive algorithm that achieves an online competitive ratio of ½-ϵ for any given constant ϵ &gt; 0. We also show that no adaptive algorithm can achieve a ratio of ½ + o (1) based on the same benchmark LP. Through a data-driven analysis on a massive openly available dataset, we show our model is robust enough to capture the application of taxi dispatching services and ride-sharing systems. We also present heuristics that perform well in practice.

John P. Dickerson

Karthik A. Sankararaman

Aravind Srinivasan

Pan Xu

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following:    Agents in networks  Algorithmic game theory  Computation of equilibria  Computational social choice  Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy")  Design and analysis of electronic markets  Economics of computational advertising  Electronic commerce  Learning in games and markets  Mechanism design  Paid search auctions  Privacy  Recommendation / reputation / trust systems  Systems resilient against malicious agents.

The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that explore the intersection of computer science and economics. The journal is interested in topics relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to: agents in networks, algorithmic game theory, computation of equilibria, computational social choice, the cost of strategic behavior and decentralization ("price of anarchy"), design and analysis of electronic markets, economics of computational advertising, electronic commerce, learning in games and markets, mechanism design, paid search auctions, privacy, recommendation/reputation/trust systems, and systems resilient against malicious agents.

《ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation》欢迎提交高质量的论文，探讨计算机科学与经济学的交叉领域。期刊关注的主题包括但不限于：网络中的代理、算法博弈论、均衡计算、计算社会选择、战略行为和去中心化的成本（"无序价格"）、电子市场的设计与分析、计算广告的经济学、电子商务、游戏与市场中的学习、机制设计、付费搜索拍卖、隐私、推荐/声誉/信任系统，以及抵御恶意代理的系统。

Allocation Problems in Ride-sharing Platforms

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Journal Info

Category	Quartile
COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS	4