Abstract Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.

Murat C Mungan

American Law and Economics Review

The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.

The field of law and economics has experienced rapid growth over the past 25 years. One of the significant developments in the 1990s was the founding of the American Law and Economics Association (ALEA). The establishment and swift expansion of ALEA, along with the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada, reflect the increasing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policymakers.

法律与经济学领域在过去25年中迅速崛起。1990年代的重要发展之一是美国法律与经济学协会（American Law and Economics Association）的成立。ALEA的创建及其快速扩展，以及在欧洲、拉丁美洲和加拿大成立的类似协会，证明了法官、从业者和政策制定者对法律经济学视角的日益接受。

Category	Quartile
社会学	3
社会学, 法学	3
社会学, 经济学	4

Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability

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