An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the 'Save PDF' action button.

Aja Watkins

Philosophy of Science

Paleoclimate Proxies and the Benefits of Disunity – ERRATUM

古气候代用指标与不统一的好处——勘误

Abstract This paper advances a theory of disease as domino dysfunction. It is often argued that diseases are biological dysfunctions. However, a theory of disease as biological dysfunction is complicated by some plausible cases of dysfunction, which seem clearly non-pathological. I argue that pathological conditions are not just dysfunctions but domino dysfunctions, and that domino dysfunctions can be distinguished on principled biological grounds from non-pathological dysfunctions. I then show how this theory can make sense of the problem cases; they are not diseases because they are not domino dysfunctions.

Harriet Fagerberg

A Domino Theory of Disease

疾病的连锁反应理论

Abstract In this paper I offer a model-theoretic interpretation of Autonomy Theory as defended by Moreno, Mossio, Montévil and Bich. I address accusations that Autonomy Theory is excessively liberal, such as those made by Garson (2017), arguing that these misunderstand the role of strategic abstractions and generalizations in theory construction. Conceiving of closure of constraints as a model-building effort that emphasizes generality – in the spirit of Levins (1966) – also clarifies its potential for application in empirical contexts.

Campbell Rider

Closure of Constraints as a Theoretical Model

约束闭合作为理论模型

Abstract Since Cannon, inspired by Bernard’s discussion of the conditions required for free and independent life, introduced the term homeostasis , many have embraced it as the main theoretical principle guiding physiology and medicine. Nonetheless, critics have argued that homeostasis is too limiting and have advanced a variety of alternative concepts such as heterostasis , rheostasis , and allostasis . We argue that the critics target a much narrower understanding of homeostasis put forward by the cyberneticists and that Bernard and Cannon embraced a far broader understanding that can accommodate the alternatives advanced by the critics and provide an integrated theoretical framework for physiology.

William Bechtel

Leonardo Bich

Rediscovering Bernard and Cannon: Restoring the Broader Vision of Homeostasis Eclipsed by the Cyberneticists

重新发现伯纳德与坎农：恢复被控制论者遮蔽的稳态更广阔视野

Abstract In response to the DSM ’s crisis in validity, psychiatry has seen a proliferation of alternative research frameworks (HiTOP, the Network Approach, RDoC) for studying and classifying psychiatric disorders. In this paper, I argue the existence of multiple frameworks in which each employs their own standards of validity is problematic methodologically speaking for trying to do any kind of unified validation work. Fundamental disagreements concerning the underlying phenomenon, sources of validating evidence, and the very nature of validity move each framework into an unrecognized plurality. The consequence for psychiatry is a new validity crisis.

Nicholas Zautra

Psychiatry’s New Validity Crisis: The Problem of Disparate Validation

精神病学的新有效性危机：差异验证问题

Abstract A widespread view has it that qualitative research in the social sciences is of poor quality because it lacks effective debiasing methods. In this paper, I zoom in on researcher bias in qualitative data collection. First, I provide a brief outline of qualitative data collection and develop a suitable account of bias. On that basis, I argue that qualitative researchers may mitigate researcher bias through the combined use of two strategies that capitalize on main characteristics of qualitative data collection. Lastly, I defend the two debiasing strategies against possible objections to their effectiveness.

Julie Zahle

Bias and Debiasing Strategies in Qualitative Data Collection

定性数据收集中的偏差与去偏策略

Abstract Recent developments in foundations of physics have given rise to a class of views suggesting that physically meaningful descriptions must always be relativized to a physical perspective. In this article I distinguish between strong physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all facts must be relativized to a perspective, and moderate physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all empirically meaningful descriptions must be relativized to a perspective. I argue that scientific evidence and philosophical considerations support moderate physical perspectivalism over strong physical perspectivalism. In particular, motivations connected to epistemic humility and the social nature of science are more compatible with the moderate approach.

Emily Adlam

Moderate Physical Perspectivalism

适度物理视角主义

Abstract Traditional wisdom dictates that statistical model outputs are estimates, not measurements. Despite this, statistical models are employed as measurement instruments in the social sciences. In this article, I scrutinize the use of a specific model—the logit model—for psychological measurement. Given the adoption of a criterion for measurement that I call comparability, I show that the logit model fails to yield measurements due to properties that follow from its fixed residual variance.

Stella Fillmore-Patrick

The Logit Model Measurement Problem

Logit模型测量问题

Abstract The article reevaluates the distinction between experiment and observation. It is first argued that to get clear on what role observation plays in the generation of scientific knowledge, we need to distinguish “experiential observation” as a concept closely connected to experience from “observation” in a technical sense and from “field observation” as a concept that reasonably contrasts with “experiment.” It is then argued that observation construed as field observation can enjoy systematic epistemic advantages over experiment, contrary to appearances.

Florian J. Boge

Re-Assessing the Experiment / Observation-Divide

重新评估实验与观察的区分

Abstract Knuuttila and Morgan (2019) challenge the widespread understanding that deidealization is no more than a simple process of relaxing assumptions to build increasingly more realistic models. They submit that, in practice, processes of model deidealization are diverse and complex and thus warrant more explicit scrutiny. Drawing on a case from economics, my analysis extends their proposal by showing how narratives, as additional representational forms, can assume a crucial role in deidealizing mathematical models. I thereby propose to consider that processes of model deidealization are not necessarily exhausted by processes in which one theoretical mathematical model is replaced with another one.

Alexandra Quack

How Narratives Can Deidealize Models

叙事如何去理想化模型

自 1934 年成立以来，科学哲学及其赞助社会科学哲学协会一直致力于从科学哲学的不同角度推进研究和自由讨论。该杂志包含散文、讨论文章和书评。

Since its establishment in 1934, the journal "Philosophy of Science" and its sponsoring society for the philosophy of social science have been dedicated to advancing research and free discussion from various perspectives of the philosophy of science. The journal includes essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.

自 1934 年成立以来，《Philosophy of Science》及其赞助的社会科学哲学协会一直致力于从科学哲学的不同角度推动研究和自由讨论。该杂志包含散文、讨论文章和书评。

Journals	Philosophy of Science
ISSN	0031-8248, 1539-767X
h-index	84
Journal Impact	1.37
Quartiles(Global)	HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE(Q1)
Quartiles(China)	哲学(2区)哲学科学史与科学哲学(2区)