SYNTHESE 是一本哲学期刊，专注于认识论、科学哲学和相关领域的当代问题。更具体地说，我们将我们感兴趣的领域分为四类：（1）认识论、方法论和科学哲学，这些都是广泛理解的。 (2) 逻辑和数学的基础，其中“逻辑”、“数学”和“基础”都是广义的。 (3)哲学中的形式方法，包括将哲学与其他学术领域联系起来的方法。 (4) 伦理学和逻辑、数学和科学的历史和社会学问题，这些问题有助于当代研究 SYNTHESES 所关注的，如上文 (1)-(3) 所述。

SYNTHESE is a philosophy journal that focuses on contemporary issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and related fields. We categorize our areas of interest into four groups: (1) broadly understood epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science; (2) foundations of logic and mathematics, where 'logic', 'mathematics', and 'foundations' are understood in a broad sense; (3) formal methods in philosophy, particularly methods that connect philosophy with other academic disciplines; (4) ethical issues and the historical and sociological aspects of logic, mathematics, and science, which are significant for contemporary research in the areas of interest outlined in (1)-(3).

SYNTHESE 是一本专注于认识论、科学哲学及相关领域当代问题的哲学期刊。我们将关注的领域分为四个类别：（1）广泛理解的认识论、方法论和科学哲学；（2）逻辑和数学基础，其中“逻辑”、“数学”和“基础”均为广义概念；（3）哲学中的形式方法，尤其是将哲学与其他学科相结合的方法；（4）伦理学以及逻辑、数学和科学的历史与社会学问题，这些问题对当代研究 SYNTHESE 所关注的领域（如前述的 (1)-(3)）具有重要意义。

Synthese

The concept of empathy has received much attention from philosophers and also from both cognitive and social psychologists. It has, however, been given widely conflicting definitions, with some taking it primarily as an epistemological notion and others as a social one. Recently, empathy has been closely associated with the simulationist approach to social cognition and, as such, it might be thought that the concept’s utility stands or falls with that of simulation itself. I suggest that this is a mistake. Approaching the question of what empathy is via the question of what it is for, I claim that empathy plays a distinctive epistemological role: it alone allows us to know how others feel. This is independent of the plausibility of simulationism more generally. With this in view I propose an inclusive definition of empathy, one likely consequence of which is that empathy is not a natural kind. It follows that, pace a number of empathy researchers, certain experimental paradigms tell us not about the nature of empathy but about certain ways in which empathy can be achieved. I end by briefly speculating that empathy, so conceived, may also play a distinctive social role, enabling what I term ‘transparent fellow-feeling’.

Joel Smith

What is empathy for?

同理心有何作用？

Torin Alter

Robert J. Howell

Physicalism, supervenience, and monism

物理主义、随附性和一元论

Daniel C. Burnston

Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface

认知渗透与认知-知觉界面

This essay tackles head on the argument that sees an inherent paradox in the autonomy of the will as the ground for the authority of the fundamental practical norms. It points out that only on reductive understandings of the autonomy of the will can this idea be qualified as paradoxical, thereby yielding outcomes that either contradict their premises or present autonomy under a false guise. With that done, it will proceed to offer a conception of the autonomy of the will which is not vulnerable to the paradox, and which may therefore be equipped to rest the fundamental practical norms on solid ground. Throughout this discussion, I will rely on constitutivism about practical reasons to specifically defend the twofold conclusion that (a) the paradox of autonomy can be avoided and that, relatedly, (b) if autonomy is properly conceptualised, it is fully equipped and well positioned to ground the authority of the fundamental practical norms.

Stefano Bertea

Is the autonomy of the will a paradoxical idea?

意志自主是一个悖论性的概念吗？

Abstract Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to the perceiver in perceptual experience. I argue that the two elements cannot play together as Matthen envisages. Beginning with the referential element, I show that the feeling of presence is unable to both provide demonstrative reference and assert that the visual state reflects how things are. Turning to the descriptive element, I argue that Matthen is committed to a view on which descriptive (or image) content is a mental entity, a reified image. This is a common element across perceptual experience, episodic memory and visual imagination. The mental entity proves a defective ingredient in assembling perceptual content that purports to present reality. There are problems integrating the depicted viewpoint with the subject’s actual viewpoint, and problems maintaining a coherent notion of assertion. I argue that the project of assembling perceptual experience from descriptive and referential elements is unworkable.

Max Minden Ribeiro

An assembled message: Matthen on the content of perceptual experience

一个组合的信息：马瑟森论知觉经验的内容

Petri Ylikoski

Getting lost with levels: the sociological micro-macro problem

迷失于层次之间：社会学的微观-宏观问题

Hong Hui Choi

Preregistration and predictivism

预注册与预测主义

Abstract Recent work in the metaphysics of gender mostly focuses on trying to solve the exclusion problem - roughly, the problem of giving a metaphysical account of gender that doesn’t exclude anyone from their appropriate gender category. It is acknowledged that no completely satisfactory answer to the exclusion problem has yet been given in the literature; typically such theories fail to account for the diverse experiences and characteristics of trans people. One response is to adopt an anti-realism about gender properties, such as Heather Logue’s gender fictionalism. I rebut the move to an anti-realism, showing that it relies on assuming a representationalism about gender vocabulary that we need not hold. I put forward a non-representationalist theory of gender properties that analyses gender vocabulary in terms of its inferential profile, rather than its representational features. This theory constitutes a deflationary realism about gender properties; it solves the inclusion problem, and guarantees the first-person epistemic authority of an individual regarding their own gender identity.

Abbreviation
Journal Impact	1.22
Quartiles(Global)	W_MULTIPLE(Q1)

ISSN	0039-7857, 1573-0964
h-index	83
Top Journals	Yes

Publication Information	Publisher: Springer Netherlands，Publishing cycle: Monthly，Journal Type: journal，Open Access Journals: No
Basic data	Year of publication: 1966，Proportion of original research papers: 99.80%，Self Citation Rate:15.40%， Gold OA Rate: 43.14%
Average review cycle	网友分享经验：平均1.0个月
Average recruitment ratio	网友分享经验：容易

Synthese

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