BBS 是国际知名期刊，采用开放同行评论的创新格式。心理学、神经科学、行为生物学或认知科学的任何领域的研究人员发表了特别重要和有争议的作品，以及这些学科内和跨学科专家对每篇文章的 10-25 条评论，以及作者对它们的回应. 结果是一个引人入胜的独特论坛，用于交流、批评、刺激，特别是从分子神经生物学到人工智能和心灵哲学的行为和脑科学研究的统一。

Behavioral and Brain Sciences is an internationally renowned journal that employs an innovative open peer review format. Researchers from fields such as psychology, neuroscience, behavioral biology, and cognitive science publish particularly significant and controversial works here. Each article receives 10 to 25 comments from experts within and across disciplines, to which the authors respond. The result is an engaging and unique forum for communication, critique, and stimulation, particularly in the unified study of behavioral and brain sciences, ranging from molecular neurobiology to artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind.

《Behavioral and Brain Sciences》是一本国际知名的期刊，采用开放同行评审的创新格式。心理学、神经科学、行为生物学和认知科学等领域的研究人员在此发表特别重要和有争议的研究成果。每篇文章都会收到10到25条来自该领域内及跨学科专家的评论，作者也会对此进行回应。最终形成了一个引人入胜的独特论坛，促进了从分子神经生物学到人工智能和心灵哲学等领域的行为与脑科学研究的交流与批评。

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Traditional mechanistic accounts of language processing derive almost entirely from the study of monologue. Yet, the most natural and basic form of language use is dialogue. As a result, these accounts may only offer limited theories of the mechanisms that underlie language processing in general. We propose a mechanistic account of dialogue, the interactive alignment account, and use it to derive a number of predictions about basic language processes. The account assumes that, in dialogue, the linguistic representations employed by the interlocutors become aligned at many levels, as a result of a largely automatic process. This process greatly simplifies production and comprehension in dialogue. After considering the evidence for the interactive alignment model, we concentrate on three aspects of processing that follow from it. It makes use of a simple interactive inference mechanism, enables the development of local dialogue routines that greatly simplify language processing, and explains the origins of self-monitoring in production. We consider the need for a grammatical framework that is designed to deal with language in dialogue rather than monologue, and discuss a range of implications of the account.

Martin J. Pickering

Simon Garrod

Behav. Brain Sci.

Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue

迈向对话的机制心理学

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations.

Stephanie D. Preston

Frans B. M. de Waal

Behav Brain Sci

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases

共情：其最终和近端基础

Abstract Curiosity and creativity are central pillars of human growth and invention. While they have been studied extensively in isolation, the relationship between them has not yet been established. We propose that curiosity and creativity both emanate from the same mechanism of novelty-seeking. We first present a synthesis showing that curiosity and creativity are affected similarly by a number of key cognitive faculties such as memory, cognitive control, attention, and reward. We then review empirical evidence from neuroscience research, indicating that the same brain regions are involved in both curiosity and creativity, focusing on the interplay between three major brain networks: the default-mode network, the salience network, and the executive control network. After substantiating the link between curiosity and creativity, we propose a novelty-seeking model (NSM) that underlies them both and suggest that the manifestation of the NSM is governed by one's state of mind (SoM).

Tal Ivancovsky

Shira Baror

Moshe Bar

A shared novelty-seeking basis for creativity and curiosity

创造力与好奇心的共同新颖性探索基础

An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example,purposeorintention, as well asknowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, and so forth. To determine whether or not the chimpanzee infers states of this kind, we showed an adult chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with a variety of problems. Some problems were simple, involving inaccessible food – bananas vertically or horizontally out of reach, behind a box, and so forth – as in the original Kohler problems; others were more complex, involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because of a malfunctioning heater, or unable to play a phonograph because it was unplugged. With each videotape the chimpanzee was given several photographs, one a solution to the problem, such as a stick for the inaccessible bananas, a key for the locked up actor, a lit wick for the malfunctioning heater. The chimpanzee's consistent choice of the correct photographs can be understood by assuming that the animal recognized the videotape as representing a problem, understood the actor's purpose, and chose alternatives compatible with that purpose.

David Premack

Guy Woodruff

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?

黑猩猩是否具有心智理论？

Abstract If group norms and decisions foster peace, then understanding how norms and decisions arise becomes important. Here, we suggest that neither norms nor other forms of group-based decision making (such as offering restitution) can be adequately understood without simultaneously considering (i) what individual psychologies are doing and (ii) the dynamics these psychologies produce when interacting with each other.

Michael E McCullough

David Pietraszewski

On the evolved psychological mechanisms that make peace and reconciliation between groups possible

论使群体间和平与和解成为可能的进化心理机制

Abstract In the human mind, what is a social relationship, and what are the developmental origins of this representation? I consider findings from infant psychology and propose that our representations of social relationships are intuitive theories built on core knowledge. I propose three central components of this intuitive theory. The purpose of the first component is to recognize whether a relationship exists, the purpose of the second is to characterize the relationship by categorizing it into a model and to compute its strength (i.e., intensity, pull, or thickness), and the purpose of the third is to understand how to change relationships through explicit or implicit communication. I propose that infants possess core knowledge on which this intuitive theory is built. This paper focuses on the second component and considers evidence that infants characterize relationships. Following Relational Models Theory (A. P. Fiske, 1992, 2004) I propose that from infancy humans recognize relationships that belong to three models: communal sharing (where people are ‘one’), authority ranking (where people are ranked), and equality matching (where people are separate, but evenly balanced). I further propose that humans, and potentially infants, recognize a relationship's strength which can be thought of as a continuous representation of obligations (the extent to which certain actions are expected), and commitment (the likelihood that people will continue the relationship). These representations and the assumption that others share them allow us to form, maintain, and change social relationships throughout our lives by informing how we interpret and evaluate the actions of others and plan our own.

Ashley J Thomas

Cognitive Representations of Social Relationships and their Developmental Origins

社会关系认知表征及其发展起源

Abstract Guided by concepts from life history (LH) theory, a large human research literature has tested the hypothesis that exposures to extrinsic mortality (EM) promote the development of faster LH strategies (e.g., earlier/faster reproduction, higher offspring number). A competing model proposes that, because EM in the past was intimately linked to energetic constraints, such exposures specifically led to the development of slower LH strategies. We empirically address this debate by examining (1) LH variation among small-scale societies under different environmental conditions; (2) country-, regional- and community-level correlations between ecological conditions, mortality, maturational timing, and fertility; (3) individual-level correlations between this same set of factors; and (4) natural experiments leveraging the impact of externally-caused changes in mortality on LH traits. Partially supporting each model, we found that harsh conditions encompassing energetic stress and ambient cues to EM (external cues received through sensory systems) have countervailing effects on the development of LH strategies, both delaying pubertal maturation and promoting an accelerated pace of reproduction and higher offspring number. We conclude that, although energetics are fundamental to many developmental processes, providing a first tier of environmental influence, this first tier alone cannot explain these countervailing effects. An important second tier of environmental influence is afforded by ambient cues to EM. We advance a 2-tiered model that delineates this second tier and its central role in regulating development of LH strategies. Consideration of the first and second tier together is necessary to account for the observed countervailing shifts toward both slower and faster LH traits.

Bruce J. Ellis

Brie M. Reid

Karen L. Kramer

Two tiers, not one: Different sources of extrinsic mortality have opposing effects on life history traits

两层而非一层：不同来源的外在死亡率对生命史特征产生相反影响

Abstract It is widely agreed upon that morality guides people with conflicting interests towards agreements of mutual benefit. We therefore might expect numerous proposals for organizing human moral cognition around the logic of bargaining, negotiation, and agreement. Yet, while “contractualist” ideas play an important role in moral philosophy, they are starkly underrepresented in the field of moral psychology. From a contractualist perspective, ideal moral judgments are those that would be agreed to by rational bargaining agents—an idea with wide-spread support in philosophy, psychology, economics, biology, and cultural evolution. As a practical matter, however, investing time and effort in negotiating every interpersonal interaction is unfeasible. Instead, we propose, people use abstractions and heuristics to efficiently identify mutually beneficial arrangements. We argue that many well-studied elements of our moral minds, such as reasoning about others’ utilities (“consequentialist” reasoning) or evaluating intrinsic ethical properties of certain actions (“deontological” reasoning), can be naturally understood as resource-rational approximations of a contractualist ideal. Moreover, this view explains the flexibility of our moral minds—how our moral rules and standards get created, updated and overridden and how we deal with novel cases we have never seen before. Thus, the apparently fragmentary nature of our moral psychology—commonly described in terms of systems in conflict—can be largely unified around the principle of finding mutually beneficial agreements under resource constraint. Our resulting “triple theory” of moral cognition naturally integrates contractualist, consequentialist and deontological concerns.

Sydney Levine

Nick Chater

Joshua B Tenenbaum

Fiery Cushman

Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition

资源合理契约主义：道德认知的三重理论

Abstract Among non-human animals, crows, octopuses and honeybees are well-known for their complex brains and cognitive abilities. Widening the lens from the idiosyncratic abilities of exemplars like these to those of animals across the phylogenetic spectrum begins to reveal the ancient evolutionary process by which complex brains and cognition first arose in different lineages. The distribution of 35 phenotypic traits in 17 metazoan lineages reveals that brain and cognitive complexity in only three lineages (vertebrates, cephalopod mollusks, and euarthropods) can be attributed to the pivotal role played by body, sensory, brain and motor traits in active visual sensing and visuomotor skills. Together, these pivotal traits enabled animals to transition from largely reactive to more proactive behaviors, and from slow and two-dimensional motion to more rapid and complex three-dimensional motion. Among pivotal traits, high-resolution eyes and laminated visual regions of the brain stand out because they increased the processing demands on and the computational power of the brain by several orders of magnitude. The independent acquisition of pivotal traits in cognitively complex (CC) lineages can be explained as the completion of several multi-trait transitions over the course of evolutionary history, each resulting in an increasing level of complexity that arises from a distinct combination of traits. Whereas combined pivotal traits represent the highest level of complexity in CC lineages, combined traits at lower levels characterize many non-CC lineages, suggesting that certain body, sensory and brain traits may have been linked (the trait-linkage hypothesis) during the evolution of both CC and non-CC lineages.

Sheryl Coombs

Michael Trestman

A multi-trait embodied framework for the evolution of brains and cognition across animal phyla

跨动物门类大脑与认知演化的多性状具身框架

Research on visual attention has uncovered significant anomalies, and some traditional methods may have inadvertently probed peripheral vision rather than attention. Vision science needs to rethink visual attention from the ground up. To facilitate this, for a year I banned the word “attention” in my lab. This constraint promoted a more precise discussion of attention-related phenomena, capacity limits, and mechanisms. The insights gained lead me to challenge attributing to “attention” those phenomena that can be better explained by perceptual processes, are predictable by an ideal observer model, or that otherwise may not require an additional mechanism. I enumerate a set of critical phenomena in need of explanation. Finally, I propose a unifying theory in which all perception results from performing a task, and tasks face a limit on complexity.

短名	Behav Brain Sci
Journal Impact	16.50
国际分区	PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL(Q1)
期刊索引	SCI Q1中科院 1 区

ISSN	0140-525X, 1469-1825
h-index	176
国内分区	心理学(1区)心理学行为科学(1区)心理学神经科学(1区)心理学心理学生物(1区)

涉及主题	心理学生物计算机科学认知心理学哲学神经科学医学认知科学认识论数学精神科物理人工智能社会心理学社会学
出版信息	出版商: Cambridge University Press，出版周期: Bimonthly，期刊类型: journal，开源期刊: 否
基本数据	创刊年份: 1978，原创研究文献占比: 100.00%，自引率:3.00%， Gold OA占比: 0.00%
平均审稿周期	网友分享经验：约稿?周期不定
平均录用比例	网友分享经验：很难

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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