The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.

The journal "Economics and Philosophy" explores the interrelationship between the disciplines of economics and philosophy. Each discipline possesses its own unique analytical methods, and their combination can yield powerful and fruitful results. By publishing articles and book reviews that link these two fields, the journal aims to promote their mutual enrichment. Topics covered include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice, historical studies in economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the application of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other related subjects.

《Economics and Philosophy》期刊致力于探讨经济学与哲学这两门学科之间的相互关系。经济学和哲学各自拥有独特的分析方法，而它们的结合能够产生强大而富有成效的成果。通过发表与这两个领域相关的文章和书评，期刊旨在促进它们的相互丰富。讨论的主题包括经济学的方法论和认识论、决策理论和博弈论的基础、理性选择的本质、具有哲学目的的经济学历史研究、经济学中的伦理问题、经济技术在伦理理论中的应用，以及其他许多相关主题。

Economics and Philosophy

Abstract It has been shown that the Mere Addition Paradox occurs in a choice-functional approach with Path Independence (Stewart R.T., 2021, Path independence and a persistent paradox of population ethics, Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming). The present study is a three-part response to this finding. First, I show that Path Independence is not an essential property leading to this paradox and that logically weaker properties can get the same result. Second, I present a rationalizable choice function that does not yield the paradox. And third, I argue that menu-dependent relations are nicely examined if Path Independence is relaxed to Property $\alpha $ (or equivalently, Contraction Consistency).

Susumu Cato

Acyclic population ethics and menu-dependent relations

非循环人口伦理与菜单依赖关系

Abstract We study original position arguments in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general formal framework for such arguments. Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social choice rules that can be supported by original position arguments. We illustrate this characterization in terms of various well-known social choice rules, some of which do and some of which do not satisfy the axioms in question. Depending on the perspective one takes, our results can be used to argue against certain rules, against Rawlsian theories of procedural fairness, or in support of richer, multidimensional models of individual choice.

Thijs De Coninck

Frederik Van De Putte

Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization

原初立场论证：一种公理化特征

James Christensen

Tom Parr

David V. Axelsen

Justice without millionaires

没有百万富翁的正义

Abstract Standard accounts of what makes exploitation wrong ground its wrong in distributive unfairness: when A exploits B he wrongs her by taking a greater share of the benefits from their interaction than he ought. I argue that this standard account does not succeed; distributive unfairness is neither the sole, nor the primary wrong of exploitation. I assume that distributive unfairness is pro tanto wrong. However, I argue that in situations where transactors’ consent to a transaction is morally valid, it is also morally transformative and overrides distributive unfairness’s pro tanto wrong. Thus, wrongful exploitation requires morally invalid consent.

Benjamin Ferguson

Exploitation’s grounding problem

剥削的根基问题

Abstract Nozick’s ‘utility monster’ is often regarded as impossible, because one life cannot be better than a large number of other lives. Against that view, I propose a purely marginalist account of utility monster defining the monster by a higher sensitivity of well-being to resources (instead of a larger total well-being), and I introduce the concept of collective utility monster to account for resource predation by a group. Since longevity strengthens the sensitivity of well-being to resources, large groups of long-lived persons may, if their longevity advantage is sufficiently strong, fall under the concept of collective utility monster, against moral intuition.

Abbreviation	Econ. Philos.
Journal Impact	1.06
Quartiles(Global)	ETHICS(Q3)

ISSN	0266-2671, 1474-0028
h-index	43

Publication Information	Publisher: Cambridge University Press，Publishing cycle: ，Journal Type: journal，Open Access Journals: No
Basic data	Year of publication: 1985，Proportion of original research papers: 100.00%，Self Citation Rate:8.30%， Gold OA Rate: 48.72%

Economics and Philosophy

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Acyclic population ethics and menu-dependent relations

Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization

Justice without millionaires

Exploitation’s grounding problem

Are long-lived persons utility monsters?

Acyclic population ethics and menu-dependent relations

Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization

Are long-lived persons utility monsters?

Exploitation’s grounding problem

Justice without millionaires