The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.

The field of law and economics has experienced rapid growth over the past 25 years. One of the significant developments in the 1990s was the founding of the American Law and Economics Association (ALEA). The establishment and swift expansion of ALEA, along with the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada, reflect the increasing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policymakers.

法律与经济学领域在过去25年中迅速崛起。1990年代的重要发展之一是美国法律与经济学协会（American Law and Economics Association）的成立。ALEA的创建及其快速扩展，以及在欧洲、拉丁美洲和加拿大成立的类似协会，证明了法官、从业者和政策制定者对法律经济学视角的日益接受。

American Law and Economics Review

Abstract Conventional wisdom in the economic analysis of tort law holds that legal errors distort incentives, causing behavior to depart from the optimum. If potential injurers know that courts err, they may engage in less or more than optimal precaution. This article revisits the effect of judicial error on the incentives of potential injurers by identifying a heretofore-neglected filtering effect of uncertainty in settings of imperfect judicial decision-making. We show that when courts make errors in the application of the liability standards, uncertainty about erroneous decision-making filters out the most harmful torts but leaves unaffected less harmful accidents. Our insight applies to various procedural and institutional aspects of legal adjudication, including the randomization of case assignment, the strength of precedent, and the use of standards versus rules.

Jef De Mot

Ben Depoorter

Thomas J Miceli

Filtering Tort Accidents

过滤侵权事故

Abstract This article presents the first empirical examination of giving to §501(c)(4) organizations, which have recently become important players in U.S. politics. Unlike gifts to charity, donations to a 501(c)(4) are not legally deductible. Yet, gifts to c(4) organizations are highly elastic to the after-tax price of charitable giving. At the lower end of the observed tax price range, c(4) giving falls with tax price, consistent with the hypothesis that giving to c(3) and c(4) organizations are substitutes. Over the top quarter of the distribution of tax price, however, gifts to c(4) organizations are negatively correlated with the after-tax price of giving to charity. That is, donors appear to respond as though the deduction subsidized their gift to a c(4). Donor responses to benefits for which they are not eligible may reflect the low salience of legal limitations or deliberate overclaiming. These results imply subsidies for charity can crowd out or in donations to c(4) organizations, with potential implications for U.S. politics. I cannot observe whether donors claim tax deductions for ineligible gifts, so the net results for the Treasury are unclear.

Brian Galle

The Dark Money Subsidy? Tax Policy and Donations to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations

暗钱补贴？税收政策与向501(c)(4)组织捐赠

Abstract Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.

Murat C Mungan

Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability

执法者责任下的歧视与威慑

Abstract There is growing evidence that childbirth can have especially adverse effects on the career advancement of women. Our study examines how this affects the fertility decisions of men and women on the partner track. We use the After the JD study, a rich panel data set on a nationally representative sample of lawyers, and find that women are more likely than men to delay their first child until after the promotion decision is resolved. This difference in fertility timing is not easily explained by gender-based sorting; however, descriptive evidence suggests that reduced employer investment in mothers and social norms that tie women to child care are relevant mechanisms.

Kyung H Park

Nayoung Rim

The Disparate Impact of Up-or-Out Promotion Policy on Fertility Timing

"Up-or-Out"晋升政策对生育时机的不均衡影响

Abstract We consider the extent to which a government regulator can harness information about a proposed rule from observing the stock price movements of the affected firms—information the regulator may in turn use to deliberate whether to adopt the rule. The rule comes with an uninformed ex ante (expected) value, which can be positive or negative. We find that if the rule’s ex ante value is positive and the regulator fully relies on the aggregate market reaction to guide its decision, then with many firms in the market, prices will exhibit maximal informativeness. When the ex ante value is negative, however, the regulator’s reliance on the market will dampen speculators’ incentives to gather information, and prices will become completely uninformative. This latter effect, however, can be mitigated if the regulator’s reliance is only partial. We also consider the presence of stakeholders who may be motivated to manipulate the market to steer the regulator toward privately beneficial outcomes. We find that with many firms in the market, such stakeholders’ incentives to manipulate will dissipate. The theoretical findings of this article suggest the potential benefits of a stock-market-based rulemaking mechanism in the absence of other forms of reliable empirical evidence.

Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

A Model of Stock-Market-Based Rulemaking

基于股票市场的规则制定模型

Abstract One of the most important and disputed questions within the fields of international relations and conflict studies concerns the issue of mediator impartiality. Should mediators be biased—supportive of one but not both of the main disputants—or should mediators always be impartial? This paper contributes to this debate by studying the effectiveness of mediation with regard to the role of mediator bias in a game-theoretic model of cheap talk. This study shows that the institutional design of a mediation process is affected by two factors: the relative degree of conflict and the incentives to misrepresent private information. We find that a necessary (but not always sufficient) condition for the success of a mediation process is a sufficiently low likelihood of a misrepresentation problem. If in addition, the relative degree of conflict is low enough, mediation is effective, and the institutional design of a mediation process is the same regardless of the bias. Otherwise, the design will be quite different depending on the direction of the bias. (JEL D63, D74, D82)

Andrés Salamanca

Biased Mediators in Conflict Resolution

冲突解决中的偏见调解人

Abstract It has become common to view credit as problematic for present-biased consumers, who are tempted to incur too much debt because of its deferred costs. But while this view is generally valid when debt is used to finance current consumption, the picture becomes much more nuanced when credit is used to fund the purchase of durable goods—such as houses, cars, and education—which is the most common use of consumer credit. When bundled with the purchase of a durable good, the deferred cost feature of credit can be a feature, not a bug. The reason is that durable goods provide deferred benefits that are also undervalued by present-biased consumers. Moreover, people often need to save in advance to finance the purchase of a durable good, and present-bias makes it difficult to save. As a result, people with present bias tend to underconsume durable goods. We show that the deferred costs of purchase debt can offset these barriers to buying durable goods and make the present-biased consumer better off both by tempting her to buy something that she should—but would not otherwise—buy and by making it easier to save up for the purchase. (JEL D90, K0, G51)

Bar-Gill Bar-Gill

Andrew T Hayashi

Present Bias and Debt-Financed Durable Goods

现期偏差与债务融资的耐用品

Abstract The myriad uncertainties common to the process of adjudication—concerning evidence that opposing parties will present, legal issues that will become relevant, illness of witnesses, and the like—lead to two social problems. First, when unanticipated events occur, the information that parties will be able to provide to courts may be inadequate. And second, preparation effort invested by parties may be wasted; whereas parties will tend to prepare for numerous possible events in adjudication, many will not come to pass and thus much effort will be for nought. Both of these problems are addressed by the granting of continuances: inability to present evidence for want of time will be directly remedied by the giving of continuances; and wasted preparation effort will be reduced because the ability to obtain continuances when uncertain events occur will lessen the need to prepare for them. But the use of continuances involves various costs of delay, meaning that the decision to grant continuances should be guided by an economic calculus. That calculus is developed in the theory presented in this article and the actual use of continuances is discussed. (JEL D8, K4, K41)

Steven Shavell

Continuances and Uncertainty in the Course of Adjudication

裁决过程中持续性与不确定性

Abstract Discovery is the formal process of exchanging information under the supervision of the courts. Since managing discovery is costly, courts have implemented case management techniques to reduce motion practice in discovery. This study examines whether case management techniques can reduce the likelihood of a discovery dispute. We attempt to untangle the impact of specific judges from the use of a particular case management technique. We focus on the use of informal discovery conferences (IDCs) in which parties meet with the judge before filing a motion to compel. The problem with simply testing whether IDCs reduce the number of discovery motions is that the use of an IDC is likely endogenous. Our solution to this endogeneity is to use the random assignment of judges. Since some judges have a higher propensity to use IDCs and some courts have begun requiring them, we have two sources of policy variation. Using this estimation strategy, we find that IDCs reduce the number and presence of discovery motions. (JEL K13, K40, K41)

Eric Helland

Minjae Yun

More Talk, Less Conflict: Evidence from Requiring Informal Discovery Conferences

多谈少冲突：要求非正式发现会议的证据

Abstract Criminal law applies to everyone, but regulations constrain only those who choose to participate in a regulated activity. Firms considering such participation face three choices: comply with imperfectly enforced rules, violate them, or stay out of the activity altogether. Importantly, regulators not only punish violators but also reward firms with a strong record of compliance. We show that the presence of compliance-contingent rewards in a regime with optional participation unsettles several tenets of the traditional optimal deterrence model: (1) the maximal sanction may not be optimal, (2) it may be optimal to over-deter violations, (3) the probability and magnitude of sanctions may be complements rather than substitutes, (4) more frequent audits may have lower enforcement costs, and (5) the pursuit of a common enforcement objective of raising the rate of compliance may lead to lower welfare even if the overall deterrence level is too low. We illustrate the practical relevance of our findings and conclude that optimal regulatory enforcement is significantly more challenging than the basic deterrence model suggests. (JEL K10, K20, K42)

短名	Am Law Econ Rev
Journal Impact	0.97
国际分区	LAW(Q2)
期刊索引	SCI Q2中科院 3 区

ISSN	1465-7252, 1465-7260
h-index	38
国内分区	社会学(3区)社会学法学(3区)社会学经济学(4区)

涉及主题	政治学法学经济计算机科学业务社会学心理学数学工程类哲学财务生物法律与经济学微观经济学医学精算学
出版信息	出版商: Oxford University Press，出版周期: ，期刊类型: journal，开源期刊: 否
基本数据	创刊年份: 2005，原创研究文献占比: 100.00%，自引率:0.00%， Gold OA占比: 8.57%

American Law and Economics Review

期刊引文格式

有 1 位以上作者的期刊

有 2 位作者的期刊

有 3 位作者的期刊

有 5 位以上作者的期刊

书籍引用格式

学位论文引用格式

网页引用格式

专利引用格式

手工熬夜修改参考文献？研飞自动匹配期刊，一键轻松成稿，支持 Word/WPS

投稿经验分享