Philosophers Imprint

Title Pending 2653

Simple taste predications come with an acquaintance requirement: they require the speaker to have had a certain kind of first-hand experience with the object of predication. For example, if I tell you that the creme caramel is delicious, you would ordinarily assume that I have actually tasted the creme caramel and am not simply relying on the testimony of others. The present essay argues in favor of a 'lightweight' expressivist account of the acquaintance requirement. This account consists of a recursive semantics and an account of assertion; it is compatible with a number of different accounts of truth and content, including contextualism, relativism, and purer forms of expressivism. The principal argument in favor of this account is that it correctly predicts a wide range of data concerning how the acquaintance requirement interacts with Boolean connectives, generalized quantifiers, epistemic modals, and attitude verbs.

Dilip Ninan

Title Pending 2683

Title Pending 1956

Title Pending 3416

Sometimes we love and hate the same thing at the same time. Margaret Cavendish (1623&amp;ndash;1673) appeals to this type of passionate conflict to argue that the mind is a material thing. When our passions conflict, the mind or reason conflicts with itself. From this, Cavendish infers that the mind has parts and, therefore, is material. Cavendish says that this argument is among the best proofs of the mind&amp;rsquo;s materiality. And yet, the existing scholarship on Cavendish lacks the kind of detailed reconstruction required to evaluate the merits of this argument. In this paper, I provide just such a reconstruction. I also show that Cavendish&amp;rsquo;s argument is an effective intervention in her dispute with Ren&amp;eacute; Descartes and Henry More about the materiality of the mind.

Colin Chamberlain

Title Pending 2503

This paper argues that profound grief stems largely from our empathy for the dead. The Epicureans defended a version of this idea, claiming that the misery of grief is the product of imagining ourselves in the place of the dead and, from that perspective, seeming to gain insight into both the harmfulness of death and the obligations of the living to the dead&amp;mdash;including the obligation to keep that misery alive. This inaugurated a tradition of suspicion of this kind of empathy, which was taken to involve a troubling confusion of self and other. Against this tradition&amp;mdash;and the influential account of empathy developed by one of its main proponents, Adam Smith&amp;mdash;I argue that empathy for the dead does indeed involve a confusion of self and other, but not one that requires correction. This empathy should be seen alongside other ethically transformative confusions of self and other&amp;mdash;such as the sort required to love one&amp;rsquo;s neighbor as oneself.

Ashley Atkins

Title Pending 2996

Standpoint theorists have long been clear that marginalization does not make better understanding a given. They have been less clear, though, that social dominance does not make&amp;nbsp;ignorance&amp;nbsp;a given. Indeed, many standpoint theorists have implicitly committed themselves to what I call the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis. According to this thesis, there are strong, substantive limits on what the socially dominant can know about oppression that they do not personally experience. I argue that this thesis is not just implausible but politically pernicious; it is an excuse for ignorance and silence that stifles our ability to address many injustices. Moreover, I argue that if we are to avoid lending support to the SEDT while working within a standpoint theory framework, we must hold that the socially dominant can achieve marginalized standpoints. So, we must hold that men can achieve feminist standpoints, that white women (and men) can achieve black feminist standpoints, and so on.

Emily C. R. Tilton

Title Pending 2796

If Badguy threatens Goodguy with harm, and Goodguy consents to giving his money to Badguy (to avoid the harm), Goodguy’s consent is invalid because coerced. But if under Badguy’s coercive threat Goodguy proceeds to consent to paying someone else (or to hiring a bodyguard), the consent may very well be valid. The challenge is to explain this difference.&amp;nbsp;In this paper I argue that the way forward is to recognize that the content of consent is contrastive – one doesn’t just agree to giving the money; rather, one consents to giving-the-money-rather-than-some-alternative. And then the normative upshot of the relevant consent depends on what the morally relevant contrast is, which in turn depends on who is (before the relevant interaction) entitled to what against whom. We have, I think, independent reasons to understand consent contrastively, and once we do, we can solve the puzzle of third party coercion with ease.&amp;nbsp;

David Enoch

Title Pending 3169

There are two main parts to this article:&amp;nbsp; (1) Quine's view of truth is substantive in a way that is not generally recognized.&amp;nbsp; There are elements in the view of deflationism, minimalism, and of course disquotationalism to be sure, but from Quine's perspective the capacity for generalization - ascribing truth not to explicitly given sentences but to kinds of sentences - requires a full-bore Tarskian apparatus.&amp;nbsp; This is necessary in order for truth to play what for Quine are its vital roles in science, philosophy (epistemology and those parts of metaphysics that Quine recognizes), and crucially in logic itself.&amp;nbsp; (These points have not been made with adequate care in the literature). (2) But is Tarskianism sufficient for playing all of those roles? Contrary to an interesting article by Lars Bergström - I argue that it is indeed sufficient, at least from Quine's point of view, and to see the point is to appreciate how thoroughgoing and powerful the notion of truth is, despite its being, 'in itself', only a device of sentential generalization.&amp;nbsp; This dovetails with Quine's famous naturalism, a connection which I bring out at the end.

Gary Kemp

Title Pending 1872

The aim of this paper is to show that, for the purposes of addressing the epistemic aspects of systemic injustice, we need a notion of emancipatory attention. &amp;nbsp;When the epistemic and ethical elements of an injustice are intertwined, it is a misleading idealisation to think of these epistemological elements as calling for the promotion of knowledge through a rational dialectic.&amp;nbsp; Taking them to instead call for a campaign of consciousness-raising runs into difficulties of its own, when negotiating the twin risks of being presumptuous about one’s own ignorance, and patronising in attributing ignorance to others.&amp;nbsp; To arrive at a better response, we should follow Marilyn Frye’s suggestion that the epistemic aspects of injustice are, at root, problems of attention.&amp;nbsp; But we fail to give an adequate account of this if we adhere to the most influential tradition of thinking about attention’s ethics, which takes its lead from Iris Murdoch’s reading of Simone Weil.&amp;nbsp; That tradition addresses attention’s significance in individual contexts, rather than social ones.&amp;nbsp; To get a better conception of the role that is played by attention in projects of social emancipation, we should take some ideas from recent work on the metaphysics of attention, together with ideas from an older tradition – represented here by R.G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art – concerning the forms of attention that are occasioned by the creation and appreciation of art.&amp;nbsp;

Christopher Mole

Title Pending 3163

On a version of consent theory that tempts many, predatory sexual relations involving significant power imbalances (e.g. between professors and students, adults and teenagers, or employers and employees) are wrong because they violate consent-centric norms. In particular, the wronged party is said to have been incapable of consenting to the predation, and the sexual wrong is located in the encounter’s nonconsensuality. Although we agree that these are sexual wrongs, we resist the idea that they are always nonconsensual. We argue instead that it is possible for students, teenagers, employees, etc. to fully consent to sexually predatory encounters; denying as much renders survivors of predation vulnerable to compounding harms. Survivors face a dilemma: give up either their understanding of their experience as wrong, or their self-conception as an agent capable of consenting. We call the latter phenomenon agential demotion.&amp;nbsp;

Melissa Rees

Jonathan Ichikawa

Title Pending 2530

Evidential Decision Theory is flawed, but its flaws are not fully understood. David Lewis (1981) famously charged that EDT recommends an irrational policy of managing the news and “commends the ostrich as rational”. Lewis was right, but the case he appealed to—Newcomb’s Problem—does not demonstrate his conclusion. Indeed, decision theories other than EDT, such as Committal Decision Theory and Functional Decision Theory, agree with EDT's verdicts in Newcomb’s Problem, but their flaws, whatever they may be, do not stem from any ostrich-like recommendations.&amp;nbsp;We offer a new case which shows that EDT mismanages the news, thus vindicating Lewis’s original charge. We argue that this case reveals a flaw in the “Why ain’cha rich?” defense of EDT. We argue further that this case is an advance on extant putative counterexamples to EDT.

Benjamin Anders Levinstein

Yoaav Isaacs

Title Pending 3176

Moral uncertainty and disagreement pervade our lives. Yet we still need to make decisions and act, both individually and politically. So, what should we do? Moral uncertainty theorists provide a theory of what individuals should do when they are uncertain about morality. Public reason liberals provide a theory of how societies should deal with reasonable disagreements about morality. They defend the public justification principle: state action is permissible only if it can be justified to all reasonable people. In this article, we bring these two approaches together. Specifically, we investigate whether considerations of moral uncertainty support public reason liberalism: given moral uncertainty, should we favor public justification? We argue that while moral uncertainty theory cannot vindicate an exceptionless public justification principle, it supports adopting public justification as a pro tanto principle &amp;ndash; albeit one that can be overridden when the moral stakes are high. It also provides new answers to some intramural debates among public reason liberals and new responses to some common objections.

Jacob Barrett

Andreas T. Schmidt

Title Pending 3016

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.How might a society wrong people by the way in which it remembers its past? In recent years, philosophers have articulated serval ways in which people may be wronged by dominant historical narratives. The aim of this paper will be to investigate an answer to this question which has yet to be explored by philosophers: a society may do wrong by employing historical narratives that consign people to history. The stories a society tells about its history may place certain identities, or practices central to those identities, in a country's past but not its present or future. I will begin by examining this phenomenon before going on to articulate the distinctive wrongs and harms involved in consigning to history. I will then argue that people have a prima facie duty not to develop or employ national narratives that consign people to history and a responsibility to challenge and resist the use of such narratives, though there may be cases where employing these narratives is justifiable.&nbsp

Title Pending 3552

This article motivates and develops a reductive account of the structure of certain physical quantities in terms of their mereology. That is, I argue that quantitative relations like "longer than" or "3.6-times the volume of" can be analyzed in terms of necessary constraints those quantities put on the mereological structure of their instances. The resulting account, I argue, is able to capture the intuition that these quantitative relations are intrinsic to the physical systems they’re called upon to describe and explain.

Zee R Perry

Title Pending 4121

Touch is standardly taken to be a proximal sense, principally constituted by capacities to detect pressure and thermal stimulation, and contrasted with the distal senses of vision and audition. It has, however, recently been argued that the scope of touch goes beyond proximal perception; touch can connect us to distal objects. Hence, touch should generally be thought of as a connection sense. In this paper, I argue that whereas pressure perception is a connection sense, thermal perception is not. Thermal perception is a proximal sense distinct from touch. One significant consequence of this is that it motivates an alternative explanation of how we detect the thermal properties of the things we touch and what they are.

Richard Gray

Title Pending 2547

Two of the most influential arguments for Bayesian updating ("Conditionalization") -- Hilary Greaves' and David Wallace's Accuracy Argument and David Lewis'&amp;nbsp;Diachronic Dutch Book Argument-- turn out to impose a strong and surprising limitation on rational uncertainty: that one can never be rationally uncertain of what one's evidence is. Many philosophers ("externalists") reject that claim, and now seem to face a difficult choice: either to endorse the arguments and give up Externalism, or to reject the arguments and lose some of the best justifications of Bayesianism. The author argues that the key to resolving this conflict lies in recognizing that both arguments are plan-based, in that they argue for Conditionalization by first arguing that one should planto conditionalize. With this in view, we can identify the culprit common to both arguments: for an externalist, they misconceive the requirement to carry out a plan made at an earlier time. They should therefore not persuade us to reject Externalism. Furthermore, rethinking the nature of this requirement allows us to give two new arguments for Conditionalization that do not rule out rational uncertainty about one's evidence and that can thus serve as common ground in the debate between externalists and their opponents.

Pablo Zendejas Medina

Just As Planned: Bayesianism, Externalism, and Plan Coherence

Most contemporary accounts of dehumanization construe it either as a psychological phenomenon of seeing the other as non-human, or as as an interpersonal phenomenon of failing to treat the other as they are entitled qua moral agent. In this paper I offer an alternative way of thinking about dehumanization. Drawing on recent work in social metaphysics, I argue that we can productively think of the human as a social kind, and correspondingly of dehumanization as a process of excommunication from that social kind. Such an approach, I show, is better equipped to explain the variety of phenomenon that constitute dehumanization, and the range of processes through which dehumanization can occur.

Suzy Killmister

Title Pending 2610

This paper introduces a novel conceptualisation of mental imagery; namely, that is grease for the mind’s gears (MGT). MGT is not just a metaphor. Rather, it describes an important and overlooked higher-order function of mental imagery: that it aids various mental faculties discharge their characteristic functional roles. MGT is motivated by reflection on converging evidence from clinical, experimental and social psychology and solves at least two neglected conceptual puzzles about mental imagery. The first puzzle concerns imagery’s architectural promiscuity; that is, its ability to assist diverse mental faculties and perform many different functions when doing so. The second puzzle concerns how to square imagery’s architectural promiscuity with its psychopathological relevance; that is, its being a maintaining cause, and possibly even a partial constituent, of several psychological disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. Mental imagery helps and harms human psychology to extreme degrees and this is something that calls for elucidation. MGT says that instead of facing perplexing heterogeneities here, we instead face a significant unity. On this score, MGT is argued to be superior to the currently dominant conception of imagery in the philosophical literature; namely, as a perception-like state of mind.

Dan Cavedon-Taylor

Title Pending 1289

Daniel J. Smith

Title Pending 3059

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.Know how and ability have a seemingly fraught relationship. I deepen the tension here, by arguing for two new pieces of data concerning know how and ability. First, know how ascriptions have two distinct readings that differ in their entailments to ability: one entails ability, the other does not. Second, in certain cases, know how claims rely on ability to have determinate truth-values at all: the indeterminacy of certain ability claims infects both readings of know how claims. No existing accounts of the relationship between know how and ability captures both data points, I argue; but intellectualists about know how have special resources to account for them. Ascriptions of knowledge of infinitival questions give rise to a distinctive kind of context-sensitivity specific to infinitivals. I show how on an intellectualist view where, very roughly, knowing how to do something is knowing an answer to an infinitival question about your abilities, this context-sensitivity accounts for the relationship between know how and ability.

David Boylan

Title Pending 2449

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published. One of the most intuitive views about the metaphysics of laws of nature is Tim Maudlin's idea of a Fundamental Law of Temporal Evolution. So-called FLOTEs are primitive elements of the universe that produce later states from earlier states. While FLOTEs are at home in traditional Newtonian and quantum mechanical theories (not to mention our pre-theoretic conception of the world), I consider here whether they can be made to work with relativity. In particular, shifting to relativistic spacetimes poses two threats to FLOTEs. First, the lack of a privileged spacelike hypersurface in relativistic spacetime makes it unclear how to understand what produces what. A survey of several conceptions of the nomic production relation compatible with relativity reveals all of them to be lacking. Second, relativity motivates a four-dimensional block universe conception of time, according to which all events that will ever occur already exist. On such a view, it's unclear what work there is to be done by FLOTEs. I consider how a proponent of FLOTEs might respond, but conclude that these combined threats seriously undermine the prospects of a productive conception of laws. In short, if spacetime is relativistic, laws are not productive.

Chris Dorst

Title Pending 3923

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published. <p class="p1" style="margin-bottom: 0px; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-feature-settings: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 13px;"><span style="font-size:16px;margin-bottom: 0px; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-feature-settings: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: &quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">One of the many debates in the philosophy of race is whether we should eliminate or conserve discourse, thought, and practices reliant on racial terms and categories (i.e., 'race' talk).&nbsp; In this paper, I consider this debate in the context of medicine.&nbsp; The recent resurgence in anti-racist activism and the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted philosophers, medical professionals, and the public to (re)consider race and its role in long-standing health disparities.&nbsp; Conservationists have offered racial classifications they believe to be medically useful in redressing racial health disparities.&nbsp; But, eliminativists have argued that the use of such classifications perpetuates the sort of racism responsible for racial health disparities.&nbsp; In what follows, I argue that while utility is insufficient for adjudicating permissible uses of race in medicine, eliminativism is neither necessary nor sufficient for dealing with the sort of ills eliminativists are concerned with.&nbsp; I, then, use a virtue-based framework to offer a novel conservationist position on the use of race in medicine.&nbsp; In doing so, I demonstrate the limitations of eliminativism, offer a position that adequately assuages eliminativists' concerns without precluding the epistemic and social benefits highlighted by conservationists, and demonstrate that the debate regarding the elimination or conservation of 'race' talk need not depend on conclusive answers to metaphysical questions regarding race.

Title Pending 4295

Title Pending 4357

This paper reconsiders Leibniz’s conception of the nature of possible things and offers a novel interpretation of the actualization of possible substances. This requires analyzing a largely neglected notion, the reality of individual essences. Thus far scholars have tended to construe essences as representational items in God’s intellect. We acknowledge that finite essences have being in the divine intellect but insist that they are also grounded in the infinite essence of God, as limitations of it. Indeed, we show that it is critical to understand that this dependence on God’s essence is prior to the dependence on God through divine ideas. Here it is crucial to distinguish questions concerning the ontological status of essences from questions concerning their reality. This yields a fresh view of Leibniz’s theory of creation, which takes seriously his claim that the same thing is first a mere possibility but after creation an actually existent substance.

Peter Myrdal

Arto Repo

Valtteri Viljanen

Leibniz on Possibilia, Creation, and the Reality of Essences

Some moral value is transparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasibly come to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In this paper, I consider whether legitimacy–that is, the property of exercises of political power to be (at least) permissible–is transparent. Implicit in much theorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer two counter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can be intransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical function in our practical thought, which sometimes requires intransparency.

Matthias Brinkmann

The Intransparency of Political Legitimacy

This paper offers a new interpretation of Margaret Cavendish’s remarks on beauty. According to it, Cavendish takes beauty to be a real, response-independent quality of objects. In this sense, Cavendish is an aesthetic realist. In broad outline, I argue, this position remains constant throughout her writings. While there are passages in Cavendish’s work that might seem to count against this reading—specifically, passages on disagreement in aesthetic judgement, on the power of beauty to elicit the passions, and on our inability to specify the nature of beauty—I show that, when situated against the background of Cavendish’s broader metaphysical views, those passages in fact support the realist interpretation.

Daniel Whiting

Cavendish’s Aesthetic Realism

This paper provides an account of co-identification with fictional names, the way in which a fictional name can be used to talk about the same fictional character on disparate occasions. I develop a version of the view that fictional characters are roles constituted by sets of properties that is couched within a dynamic understanding of fictional discourse. I argue that this view captures what is right about both so-called name-centric and information-centric approaches to co-identification with fictional names. I show how the dynamic view in addition accounts for a number of uses of fictional names, including fictional uses, assertoric uses, metafictional uses.

Andreas Stokke

Fictional Names and Co-Identification

Pessimists about aesthetic testimony argue that it is inappropriate to rely on other people’s aesthetic judgments in forming our own aesthetic beliefs. Some suggest that such reliance violates an epistemic norm, others that it violates a non-epistemic norm. In making their case, pessimists offer several arguments. They also put forward cases meant to elicit pessimist intuitions. In this paper, I claim that none of the main pessimist arguments succeeds against a plausible version of optimism, that is, the view that reliance on testimony in aesthetic matters is appropriate. However, I suggest also that pessimist intuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second task is to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on their source.

Iskra Fileva

My Delicate Taste: Aesthetic Deference Revisited

In this paper I study dynamical models of rational deliberation within the context of Newcomb's problem. Such models have been used to argue against the soundness of the "tickle'" defense of evidential decision theory, which is based on the idea that sophisticated decision makers can break correlations between states and acts by introspecting their own beliefs and desires. If correct, this would show that evidential decision theory agrees with the recommendations of causal decision theory. I argue that an adequate understanding of rational deliberation leads to deliberative processes for which this idea works. My proposal is modest, though. Evidential decision theory cannot always be reconciled with causal decision theory along the lines suggested here, but the agreement between the two theories is broader than previously thought.

Simon Huttegger

Reconciling Evidential and Causal Decision Theory

Social metaphysics is a source of important philosophical and moral insight. Furthermore, much social metaphysics appears to be substantive. However, some have recently argued that standard views of metaphysics cannot accommodate substantive social metaphysics. In this paper I offer a new diagnosis of this problem and defend a new solution, showing that this problem is an illuminating lens through which to examine the nature and boundaries of metaphysics. This case instantiates a broad, common pattern generated by attempts to align distinctions between realism and anti-realism, mind-independence and mind-dependence, and legitimate and non-legitimate inquiry. I show that the best response is to abandon the association between substantive metaphysics and mind-independence, and I sketch a new definition of substantivity, given in terms of explanatory power, that makes room for substantive social metaphysics while also offering an attractive basis for general metaphysics.

Elanor Taylor

Substantive Social Metaphysics

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published. Reductive realists about normative properties are often charged with being relativists: it is often argued that their view implies that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, these judgements can both be true. I argue that reductive realists can answer this charge by copying the quasi-realist moves that many expressivists make. I then argue that the remaining difference between reductive realism and expressivism is unimportant.

Bart Streumer

Title Pending 4728

This paper discusses a novel problem at the intersection of ethics and epistemology: there can be cases in which moral considerations seem to "encroach'' upon belief from multiple directions at once, and possibly to varying degrees, thereby leaving their overall effect on belief unclear. We introduce these cases -- cases of moral encroachment under moral uncertainty -- and show that they pose a problem for all predominant accounts of moral encroachment. We then address the problem, by developing a modular Bayesian framework that, we argue, is sufficiently flexible and scaleable to accommodate the multifaceted uncertainty we describe while still generating clear recommendations for an agent's beliefs. Our framework has several practical upshots, and we close by articulating them: we derive insights about the relationship between moral character and doxastic behavior and make suggestions for how to encourage people to revise their doxastic states in morally laudable ways, without deviating from core Bayesian norms.

Boris Babic

Zoë Johnson King

Title Pending 2073

In his discussion of our idea of time in the Treatise, Hume makes the perplexing claim that unchanging objects cannot be said to endure. &amp;nbsp;While Hume is targeting the Newtonian conception of absolute time, it is not at all clear how his denial that unchanging objects are in time fits with this target. &amp;nbsp;Moreover, Hume diagnoses our belief that unchanging objects endure as the product of a psychological fiction, but his account of this fiction is also riddled with puzzling claims about our experience of unchanging objects. &amp;nbsp;In this paper, we argue that Hume’s claims are a lot less baffling and indeed, much more sophisticated than they appear. &amp;nbsp;We do so by considering his arguments as a response to Locke’s specific approach to the concept of absolute time.

Miren Boehm

Maité Cruz

Time for Hume’s Unchanging Objects

I present an account of an aspect of people’s intellectual characters that has yet to receive such direct treatment in the literature on the intellectual virtues. That aspect is our capacity to influence others in ways that make inquiry go more successfully, which I call “intellectual charisma”. In presenting this account, I first draw on work in empirical psychology to build a partial picture of intellectual charisma as a social-psychological phenomenon. I then draw on this partial picture in defining intellectual charisma, explaining some important features of it, and making the case that it meets some important conditions for qualifying as an intellectual virtue. I conclude by first discussing some of the ways that including intellectual charisma within our overall picture of the intellectual virtues changes that picture, and then outlining some of the benefits that result from those changes.

Daniel J. Stephens

Intellectual Charisma

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published. <span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Palatino;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:Palatino;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:EN-GB;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold">of advising have been scattered and somewhatdisconnected. The most focused discussion has come from philosophers oflanguage interested in whether advising is a kind of assertive or directivespeech act. This paper argues that the ordinary category of advising is muchmore heterogenous than has been appreciated: it is possible to advise byasserting relevant facts, by issuing directives, and by asking questions andother kinds of adviceless advising. The heterogeneity of advising makes speechact-theoretic accounts of advising look like accounts of special cases, andmotivates us to look elsewhere for an account of what advising is. Instead, Isuggest that we think about advising as a kind of joint practicalthinking--collaborative deliberation--, which answers to our need to poolvarious kinds of deliberative resources.<style>@font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536869121 1107305727 33554432 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Palatino;panose-1:0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;mso-font-alt:Palatino;mso-font-charset:77;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-1610611969 2013274202 341835776 0 403 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0cm;mso-pagination:none;font-size:13.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Palatino;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Palatino;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-size:13.0pt;mso-ansi-font-size:13.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Palatino;mso-ascii-font-family:Palatino;mso-hansi-font-family:Palatino;mso-bidi-font-family:Palatino;}.MsoPapDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-pagination:none;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}</style>

Title Pending 3047

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published. Blame abounds in our everyday lives, perhaps no more so than on social media. With the rise of social networking platforms, we have access to more information about others’ blameworthy behaviour and larger audiences to whom we can express our blame. But these audiences, while large, are typically not diverse. Social media tends to create what I call “blame bubbles”: systems in which expressions of blame are shared amongst agents with similar moral outlooks while dissenting views are excluded. Many have criticised the blame expressed on social media, arguing that it is often unfitting, excessive, and counterproductive. In this talk, I’ll argue that while blame bubbles can be guilty of these charges, they are also well placed to do important moral work. I’ll then attempt to identify the causal source of these bad-making features and explore potential structural interventions that can make blame bubbles better at performing their moral function and less likely to generate harmful consequences.<o:p></o:p>

Title Pending 3761

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published. How should your opinion change in response to the opinion of an epistemic peer? We show that the pooling rule known as "upco" is the unique answer satisfying some natural desiderata. If your revised opinion will influence your opinions on other matters by Jeffrey conditionalization, then upco is the only standard pooling rule that ensures the order in which peers are consulted makes no difference. Popular proposals like linear pooling, geometric pooling, and harmonic pooling cannot boast the same. In fact, no alternative to upco can if it possesses four minimal properties which these proposals share.

Richard Pettigrew

Jonathan Weisberg

Title Pending 3806

In philosophy of music, formalists argue that pure instrumental music is unable to represent any content without the help of lyrics, titles, or dramatic context. In particular, they deny that music’s use of convention counts as a genuine case of representation because only intrinsic means of representing counts and conventions are extrinsic to the sound structures making up music. In this paper, I argue that convention should count as a way for music to genuinely represent content for two reasons. First, the view that only intrinsic ways of representing counts is too stringent. If use can ground meaning in language, then use might also ground meaning (and representation) in music, too. Second, even if we were to insist on intrinsic features, convention should count as a way for music to genuinely represent because convention is an intrinsic feature of music. Without knowledge of musical systems and encultured listening, music wouldn’t even be recognized as music, so convention is already baked into our listening practices.

Hannah H. Kim

Convention and Representation in Music

According to an intriguing though somewhat enigmatic line of thought first proposed by Jonathan Bennett, if humanity went extinct any time soon this would be unfortunate because important business would be left unfinished. This line of thought remains largely unexplored. I offer an interpretation of the idea that captures its intuitive appeal, is consistent with plausible constraints, and makes it non-redundant to other views in the literature. The resulting view contrasts with a welfare-promotion perspective, according to which extinction would be bad because it would come at a massive opportunity cost in terms of feasibly achievable welfare over the lifetime of our species.

Jonathan Knutzen

Unfinished Business

Plausibly, one important part of a good life is doing work that makes a contribution, or a positive difference to the world. In this paper, however, I explore contribution pessimism, the view that people will not always have adequate opportunities for making contributions. I distinguish between three interestingly different and at least initially plausible reasons why this view might be true: in slogan form, things might become too easy, they might become too good, or we might be too late. Now, one response to these problems might be to deliberately attempt to undo them. However, I claim that this solution is intuitively misguided, and argue that explaining this supports a holistic approach to the value of contributions. Finally, I argue that if contribution pessimism is correct, it could provide an explanation of some widely held intuitions about issues in population ethics, with implications about the practical issue of how much priority we should give to addressing risks of human extinction.

Alexander Dietz

Too Easy, Too Good, Too Late?

In public discourse, activists are often criticized for directing their acts of political resistance against this or that specific target. Underlying these criticisms appears to be a strongly held, though underarticulated, intuitive moral judgment that some targets are legitimate whereas others are not. Little philosophical attention has been paid to this issue. My primary aim is to address this neglect. I specify a central part of this intuitive judgment – centering on persons and activities – and argue that there is a principled way to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. This specification relies on a novel conception of political resistance, which focuses on its defensive rather than communicative aspect. I then extend the idea of forfeiture to argue that acts of political resistance are correctly directed when they are aimed at those activities of liable persons that cause injustice. My discussion contributes to vindicating our intuitive judgments about several controversial cases of political resistance.&amp;nbsp;

Chong-Ming Lim

The legitimate targets of political disobedience

What are the philosophical views of professional philosophers, and how do these views change over time? &amp;nbsp;The 2020 PhilPapers Survey surveyed around 2000 philosophers on 100 philosophical questions. The results provide a snapshot of the state of some central debates in philosophy, reveal correlations and demographic effects involving philosophers' views, and reveal some changes in philosophers' views over the last decade.

David Bourget

David J. Chalmers

Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey

Hume often praises and appeals to the theoretical virtue of simplicity in his philosophy. Yet there has been relatively little scholarship done on Hume’s conception of theoretical simplicity. This paper will look to rectify this lacuna in the literature. In particular, it will look to answer three questions as they relate to Hume’s philosophy. First, what is theoretical simplicity? Second, why should we favour simpler theories over more complex ones? Third, can a theory be too simple, and if so, how?The paper will argue that for Hume, theoretical simplicity concerns the causal explanation of phenomena in terms of the fewest possible causes. Second, simplicity has both epistemic and aesthetic value for Hume. While he does not follow his contemporaries in appealing to God to justify the truth-conduciveness of theoretical simplicity, some of his discussions of this virtue include elements suggestive of a meta-inductive justification of it. In addition, Hume also sees theoretical simplicity as having an intrinsic aesthetic value over and above its epistemic merit. Third, Hume recognises that there are both epistemic and aesthetic tradeoffs involved with theoretica lsimplicity, which might rule against an overly simple theory.

Hsueh Qu

Hume on Theoretical Simplicity

Surface presentism is the combination of a general relativistic physics with a presentist metaphysics. In this paper, we provide an argument against this combination based on black holes. The problem focuses on the notion of an event horizon. We argue that the present locations of event horizons are ontologically dependent on future black hole regions, and that this dependence is incompatible with presentism. We consider five responses to the problem available to the surface presentist, and argue that none succeed. Surface presentism thus faces the prospect of empirical refutation based on the evidence available for the existence of black holes.

Sam Baron

Baptiste Le Bihan

Trouble on the Horizon for Presentism

Drawing on the 1870s-1880s work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Kelly, William James famously characterised the specious present as ‘the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible’. Literature on the pre-history of late nineteenth century specious present theories clusters around the work of John Locke and Thomas Reid, and I argue it is incomplete. The pre-history is missing an inter-connected group of English philosophers writing on the present between 1749 and 1785: David Hartley, Joseph Priestley, Abraham Tucker, and William Watson. With William Herschel, Watson even conducted experiments to determine the limits of human temporal perception. These thinkers do not appear in the specious present literature, or broader historical surveys of temporal consciousness. Yet this paper shows that they all produced important work on our experience of the present, variously defending theses that can be found in subsequent specious present theories. It argues their texts reward study, and may have influenced later theorists; contextualises the nineteenth century theories of James and others; and pushes back the start date of the 'standard history' of micro time by over half a century.

Emily Thomas

The Specious Present in English Philosophy 1749-1785: Theories and Experiments in Hartley, Priestley, Tucker, and Watson

This paper examines the logical and metaphysical consequences of denying Leibniz's Law, the principle that if t1= t2, then φ(t1) if and only if&amp;nbsp;φ(t2). Recently, Caie, Goodman, and Lederman (2020) and Bacon and Russell (2019) have proposed sophisticated logical systems permitting violations of Leibniz's Law. We show that their systems conflict with widely held, attractive principles concerning the metaphysics of individuals. Only by adopting a highly revisionary picture, on which there is no finest-grained equivalence relation, can a well-motivated metaphysics for rejecting Leibniz's Law be developed. We sketch one such picture—a metaphysics of stuff. Stuff ontologies can be initially motivated through ordinary language: stuff stands to mass nouns as objects stand to count nouns. The stuff ontology we propose takes stuff to be fundamental and views the world as composed of an infinite descending hierarchy of kinds and portions of stuff. We defend the coherence of this picture and offer a model theory demonstrating that it can be consistently formalized.

Catharine Diehl

Beau Madison Mount

The Metaphysics of Opacity

Mathematical diagrams are frequently used in contemporary mathematics. They are, however, widely seen as not contributing to the justificatory force of proofs: they are considered to be either mere illustrations or shorthand for non-diagrammatic expressions.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; Moreover, when they are used inferentially, they are seen as threatening the reliability of proofs.&amp;nbsp; In this paper, I examine certain examples of diagrams that resist this type of dismissive characterization. By presenting two diagrammatic proofs, one from topology and one from algebra, I show that diagrams form genuine notational systems, and I argue that this explains why they can play a role in the inferential structure of proofs without undermining their reliability.&amp;nbsp; I then consider whether diagrams can be essential to the proofs in which they appear.@font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:swiss;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536859905 -1073697537 9 0 511 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0in;line-height:200%;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoPapDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;line-height:200%;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}

短名
Journal Impact	1.45
期刊索引	中科院 1 区

ISSN	1533-628X
h-index	29
国内分区	哲学(1区)哲学哲学(1区)
Top期刊	是

涉及主题	哲学认识论计算机科学心理学政治学法学数学生物物理社会学经济语言学神学艺术社会心理学量子力学人工智能程序设计语言统计
出版信息	出版商: University of Michigan Press，出版周期: ，期刊类型: journal
基本数据	创刊年份: 2012，原创研究文献占比: 100.00%，自引率:7.10%， Gold OA占比: 26.44%
平均审稿周期	网友分享经验：20 Weeks

Philosophers Imprint

期刊引文格式

只有1位作者的期刊

有2位作者的期刊

有3位作者的期刊

有5位以上作者的期刊

书籍引用格式

学位论文引用格式

网页引用格式

专利引用格式

最新文章

Title Pending 2653

Title Pending 2683

Title Pending 1956

Title Pending 3416

Title Pending 2503

Title Pending 2996

Title Pending 2796

Title Pending 3169

Title Pending 1872

Title Pending 3163

Title Pending 2530

Title Pending 3176

Title Pending 3016

Title Pending 3552

Title Pending 4121

Title Pending 2547

Just As Planned: Bayesianism, Externalism, and Plan Coherence

Title Pending 2610

Title Pending 1289

Title Pending 3059

Title Pending 2449

Title Pending 3923

Title Pending 4295

Title Pending 4357

Leibniz on Possibilia, Creation, and the Reality of Essences

The Intransparency of Political Legitimacy

Cavendish’s Aesthetic Realism

Fictional Names and Co-Identification

My Delicate Taste: Aesthetic Deference Revisited

Reconciling Evidential and Causal Decision Theory

Substantive Social Metaphysics

Title Pending 4728

Title Pending 2073

Time for Hume’s Unchanging Objects

Intellectual Charisma

Title Pending 3047

Title Pending 3761

Title Pending 3806

Title Pending 2503

Title Pending 2530

Convention and Representation in Music

Unfinished Business

Too Easy, Too Good, Too Late?

The legitimate targets of political disobedience

Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey

Hume on Theoretical Simplicity

Trouble on the Horizon for Presentism

The Specious Present in English Philosophy 1749-1785: Theories and Experiments in Hartley, Priestley, Tucker, and Watson

The Metaphysics of Opacity

Who's Afraid of Mathematical Diagrams?

帮你贴心管理全部的文献.css-5myebc{font-size:14px;font-weight:var(--chakra-fontWeights-normal);margin-top:var(--chakra-space-1);margin-bottom:var(--chakra-space-1);}研飞ivySCI，高效的论文管理

帮你贴心管理全部的文献
研飞ivySCI，高效的论文管理