Advances in Theoretical Economics

This paper presents a very general linear production model which nevertheless shows an extremely regular behaviour. We can ensure the solvability of the associated equilibrium systems for quantities and prices and the nonsubstitution property, allowing for joint production and non-square systems. We also discuss the application of this model to the measurement of productivity differences. The assumptions we use are intuitive and very mild (e.g. they are necessary for the type of solvability we require). Proofs are simple and rely on geometrical arguments (the separation theorems), rather than on the use of the theory of determinants.

Antonio Villar

The Generalized Linear Production Model: Solvability, Nonsubstitution and Productivity Measurement

广义线性生产模型：可解性、非替代性和生产率测量

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size, the evolutionary process can select any strict Nash equilibrium if the probability of choosing a nonbest response is state-dependent. This paper shows that the unique selection of the risk dominant equilibrium is robust with respect to state dependent mutation in local interaction games. More precisely, for any given mutation structure there exists a minimum population size beyond which the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. Our result is driven by contagion and cohesion among players, which exist only in local interaction settings and favor the risk dominant strategy. Our result strengthens the equilibrium selection result of evolutionary game theory.

In Ho Lee

Adam Szeidl

Akos Valentinyi

Contagion and State Dependent Mutations

传染与状态依赖的突变

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of common agency games with direct externalities between principals when they compete with nonlinear prices. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal directly affects the other principal's payoff. First, we characterize the set of pure-strategy, symmetric equilibria under complete information of an intrinsic common agency game. This set of equilibria is large because of the presence of price-output offers by the principals that are unchosen by the agent in equilibrium. Equilibria exist in which principals offer out-of-equilibrium price-output choices to the agent and induce aggressive, low-price behavior corresponding to marginal-cost pricing in the extreme case. We then show that this equilibrium set of outputs is robust to the possibility that agent refuses any of the offered contracts; the case of delegated agency. Second, we introduce asymmetric information in order to rationalize existing nonlinear pricing contracts. The introduction of asymmetric information has the effect of restricting the set of equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game.

David Martimort

Lars Stole

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

合同外部性与共同代理均衡

We study trading models when the distribution of signals such as costs or values is not known to traders or the mechanism designer when the profit-maximizing trading procedure is designed. We present adaptive mechanisms that simultaneously elicit this information (market research) while maintaining incentive compatibility and maximizing profits when the set of traders is large (market design). First, we study a monopoly pricing model where neither the seller nor the buyers know the distribution of values. Second, we study a model with a broker intermediating trade between a large number of buyers and sellers with private information about their valuations and costs. We show that when the set of traders becomes large our adaptive mechanisms achieve the same expected profits for the monopolist and the broker as when the distribution of signals is common knowledge.

Sandeep Baliga

Rakesh Vohra

Market Research and Market Design

市场研究与市场设计

We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated strategy can emerge in an evolutionary game subject to symmetric decaying perturbations.

Yossi Feinberg

Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection

进化动力学与长期选择

A rational bidder in a private-value auction should be reluctant to incur the cost of perfectly estimating his value if it might not matter to the success of his bidding strategy. This can explain sniping---flurries of bids at the end of auctions---as the result of other bidders trying to avoid stimulating the victim into learning more about his value. The idea of value discovery also explains why a bidder might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction and why he would like to know the private values of other bidders.

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions

拍卖中自身私人价值不确定性的战略影响

We propose a novel approach to modelling time preferences, based on a cognitive shortcoming of human decision makers: the perception of future events becomes increasingly `blurred' as the events are pushed further in time. Our model explains behavioural `anomalies' such as preference reversal and cyclical choice.

Paola Manzini

Marco Mariotti

A Vague Theory of Choice over Time

时间选择模糊理论

This paper considers the problem of an agent's choice under uncertainty in a new framework. The agent does not know the true probability distribution over the state space but is objectively informed that it belongs to a specified set of probabilities. Maintaining the hypothesis that this agent is a subjective expected utility maximizer, we address the question of how the objective information influences her subjective prior.Three plausible rules are proposed. The first, named state independence, states that the subjective probability should not depend on how the uncertain states are `labeled'. Location-consistency, the second property, assumes that `similar' objective sets of probabilities result in `similar' subjective priors. The third rule is an `update-consistency' rule. Suppose the agent selects some probability p. She is then told that the likelihood assigned by p to some event A is in fact correct; then this should not cause her to revise her choice of p.Another property, alternative to update-consistency, is also proposed. When an agent forms her subjective prior assigning subjective probabilities to events in some ordered sequence, this property requires that the resulting prior be independent of that order. This last property, named order independence, is shown to be equivalent to update-consistency.A class of sets of probabilities is found on which state independence, location-consistency and update consistency (order independence) uniquely determine a selection rule. Some intuition is given regarding why these properties work in this collection of problems.

Ettore Damiano

Choice under Limited Uncertainty

有限不确定性下的选择

This paper examines the consequences of status preferences on entrepreneurial risk-taking in a general equilibrium model of occupational choice. We distinguish between two frames of reference. In the first, status is derived from class-membership, the economic indicator of which is the expected relative income of the person's occupation. In the second, status is tied to individual income relative to the mean. We find that the effect of status needs depends on whether or not the status variable itself is subject to risk. While social status increases entrepreneurial risk-taking in the first case, the effect is ambiguous in the second and crucially depends on how status preferences alter the effective degree of risk aversion. The results carry over to the distributional consequences, where status preferences have an equalizing effect only if certain conditions are met.

Christiane Clemens

Status Concerns and Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty

不确定条件下的地位关注与职业选择

This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) Pairwise Stability concept to allow for limited observation, and apply it to a specific mutual consent network formation game. While limited observation generally leads to the existence of less efficient stable networks, I find that it can also lead to the existence of efficient stable networks. Moreover, stability restrictions considered in previous work lose their refining power as observation becomes more limited.

出版信息	出版商: Walter de Gruyter GmbH，出版周期: ，期刊类型: journal，开源期刊: 否
基本数据	创刊年份: 2003，原创研究文献占比: ，自引率:， Gold OA占比:

Advances in Theoretical Economics

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