Theoretical Economics

短名TE
Journal Impact1.11
国际分区ECONOMICS(Q3)
期刊索引SCI Q3中科院 3 区
ISSN1555-7561, 1933-6837
h-index37
国内分区经济学(3区)经济学经济学(3区)

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index

期刊主页
涉及主题经济数学计算机科学数理经济学微观经济学统计哲学业务政治学法学物理人工智能程序设计语言认识论财务生物工程类
出版信息出版商: Society for Economic Theory出版周期: 期刊类型: journal
基本数据创刊年份: 2007原创研究文献占比100.00%自引率:8.30%Gold OA占比: 99.35%
平均审稿周期 网友分享经验:52 Weeks

期刊引文格式

这些示例是对学术期刊文章的引用,以及它们应该如何出现在您的参考文献中。

并非所有期刊都按卷和期组织其已发表的文章,因此这些字段是可选的。有些电子期刊不提供页面范围,而是列出文章标识符。在这种情况下,使用文章标识符而不是页面范围是安全的。

只有1位作者的期刊

有2位作者的期刊

有3位作者的期刊

有5位以上作者的期刊

书籍引用格式

以下是创作和编辑的书籍的参考文献的示例。

学位论文引用格式

网页引用格式

这些示例是对网页的引用,以及它们应该如何出现在您的参考文献中。

专利引用格式

最新文章

On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks

2024-1-1

Direct implementation with evidence

2024-1-1

Relational enforcement

2024-1-1

Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions

2024-1-1

Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice

2024-1-1

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

2024-1-1

Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public

2024-1-1

Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game

2024-1-1

Exploiting social influence in networks

2024-1-1

Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news

2024-1-1

Time‐consistent implementation in macroeconomic games

2024-1-1

Pair‐efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

2024-1-1

Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good

2024-1-1

Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent

2024-1-1

Contracting over persistent information

2024-1-1

Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2

2024-1-1

Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation

2024-1-1

Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming

2024-1-1

A theory of fair random allocation under priorities

2024-1-1

Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3

2024-1-1

Optimal sequential contests

2024-1-1

Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness

2024-1-1

Asset bubbles and product market competition

2024-1-1

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

2024-1-1

Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions

2024-1-1

Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1

2024-1-1

Data and incentives

2024-1-1

Wages as signals of worker mobility

2024-1-1

Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1

2024-1-1

Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3

2024-1-1

Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

2024-1-1

A natural adaptive process for collective decision‐making

2024-1-1

Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2

2024-1-1

Symmetric reduced‐form voting

2024-1-1

Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules

2024-1-1

Robust performance evaluation of independent agents

2024-1-1

Digital currency and privacy

2024-1-1

The Dynamics of Instability

2024-1-1

A dynamic model of censorship

2024-1-1

Efficient incentives with social preferences

2024-1-1

Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers

2024-1-1

Correlated choice

2024-1-1

Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification

2024-1-1

Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty

2024-1-1

Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

2023-1-1

Loss aversion in sequential auctions

2023-1-1

Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3

2023-1-1

Pervasive signaling

2023-1-1

Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 1

2023-1-1

Unrestricted information acquisition

2023-1-1

帮你贴心管理全部的文献

研飞ivySCI,高效的论文管理

投稿经验分享

分享我的经验,帮你走得更远

Built withby Ivy Science
Copyright © 2020-2024
版权所有:南京青藤格致信息科技有限公司