Theoretical Economics
短名 | TE |
Journal Impact | 1.11 |
国际分区 | ECONOMICS(Q3) |
期刊索引 | SCI Q3中科院 3 区 |
ISSN | 1555-7561, 1933-6837 |
h-index | 37 |
国内分区 | 经济学(3区)经济学经济学(3区) |
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index
期刊主页涉及主题 | 经济数学计算机科学数理经济学微观经济学统计哲学业务政治学法学物理人工智能程序设计语言认识论财务生物工程类 |
出版信息 | 出版商: Society for Economic Theory,出版周期: ,期刊类型: journal |
基本数据 | 创刊年份: 2007,原创研究文献占比: 100.00%,自引率:8.30%, Gold OA占比: 99.35% |
平均审稿周期 | 网友分享经验:52 Weeks |
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