Journal of Practical Ethics

Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be impermissible because we have a right to be treated on the basis of merit and capacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. I call this suggestion the Impermissibility Account. I argue that, despite how the Impermissibility Account seems intuitive to most of us with a humanist outlook, it is indefensible. I show that well-informed discrimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we cannot have a strict right not to be discriminated against. I then propose an alternative and more plausible account which I call the Fairness and Externalities Account, arguing that acts of discrimination are wrong partly because they are unfair and partly because they create harmful externalities which — analogously to pollution — there is a collective responsibility to minimize. Both of these factors are however defeasible, meaning that if the Fairness and Externalities Account is correct, then discrimination is sometimes permissible. These results are counterintuitive, and suggest that the ethics of discrimination requires further attention.

Paul de Font-Reaulx

What Makes Discrimination Wrong

何为歧视之错

This article considers two related and fundamental issues about morality in a virtual world. The first is whether the anonymity that is a feature of virtual worlds can shed light upon whether people are moral when they can act with impunity. The second issue is whether there are any moral obligations in a virtual world and if so what they might be. Our reasons for being good are fundamental to understanding what it is that makes us moral or indeed whether any of us truly are moral. Plato grapples with this problem in book two of The Republic where Socrates is challenged by his brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon. They argue that people are moral only because of the costs to them of being immoral; the external constraints of morality. Glaucon asks us to imagine a magical ring that enables its wearers to become invisible and capable of acting anonymously. The ring is in some respects analogous to the possibilities created by online virtual worlds such as Second Life, so the dialogue is our entry point into considering morality within these worlds. These worlds are three dimensional user created environments where people control avatars and live virtual lives. As well as being an important social phenomenon, virtual worlds and what people chose to do in them can shed light on what people will do when they can act without fear of normal sanction. This paper begins by explaining the traditional challenge to morality posed by Plato, relating this to conduct in virtual worlds. Then the paper will consider the following skeptical objection. A precondition of all moral requirements is the ability to act. There are no moral requirements in virtual worlds because they are virtual and it is impossible to act in a virtual world. Because avatars do not have real bodies and the persons controlling avatars are not truly embodied, it is impossible for people to truly act in a virtual world. We will show that it is possible to perform some actions and suggest a number of moral requirements that might plausibly be thought to result. Because avatars cannot feel physical pain or pleasure these moral requirements are interestingly different from those of real life. Hume’s arguments for why we should be moral apply to virtual worlds and we conclude by considering how this explains why morality exists in these environments.

John McMillan

Mike King

Why be Moral in a Virtual World

虚拟世界中为何要讲道德

The fundamental problem of philosophy is whether doing it has any point, since if it does not have any point, there is no reason to do it. It is suggested that the intrinsic point of doing philosophy is to establish a rational consensus about what the answers to its main questions are. But it seems that this cannot be accomplished because philosophical arguments are bound to be inconclusive. Still, philosophical research generates an increasing number of finer grained distinctions in terms of which we try to conceptualize reality, and this is a sort of progress. But if, as is likely, our arguments do not suffice to decide between these alternatives, our personalities might slip in to do so. Our philosophy will then express our personality. This could provide philosophy with a point for us. If some of our conclusions have practical import, philosophy could have the further point of giving us something by which we can live.

Ingmar Persson

The Fundamental Problem of Philosophy: Its Point

哲学基本问题：其要点

Shelly Kagan

For Hierarchy in Animal Ethics

动物伦理中的层级

This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking — against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the situation of animals is similar. 
I first review some of the reasons why people are resistant to the idea that animals might have rights. I then explain Kant’s conception of natural rights. I challenge the idea that duties of aid and duties of kindness to animals fit the traditional category of “imperfect duties” and argue that they are instead cases of “imperfect right.” I explain how you can hold a right against a group, and why it is legitimate to conceive of humanity as such a group. I then argue that Kant’s account of the foundation of property rights is grounded in a conception of the common possession of the Earth that grounds a right to aid and the rights of animals to be treated in ways that are consistent with their good. Finally, I return to the objections to the idea that animals have rights and offer some responses to them.

Christine M. Korsgaard

The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right

动物的权利与陌生人的需求：两个不完全权利的案例

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.Traditionally, the discounting debate has been dominated by those who advocate equality between generational interests and those who think future generations' interests should be discounted at some positive rate. This paper argues for a novel view: future generations' interests should be negatively discounted. First I defend the claim that we have greater reason to promote the well-being of those who are more morally deserving. Then I explain why we should expect future people to be more morally deserving than us. Throughout this argument, scepticism about moral desert looms large. Nevertheless, given the context of moral uncertainty under which the discounting decision must be made, a negative discount rate remains a live option even in the face of a moderate degree of scepticism about moral desert.

Matthew Price

Title Pending 6214

标题待定 6214

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.The value of a person's life is not reducible to the satisfaction of one's desires or interests, including the interest in living longer. A person who takes pleasure in beach vacations each summer may look forward to another stay at the shore next year, but this is not the kind of interest that gives her a reason to continue living. Assuming she has lived a normal life, one beach vacation more or less will not affect the value of her life, even in the slightest degree. Similarly, we wouldn't say of a person who has lived a full life that his life would have been more valuable if he hadn't suffered that wretched toothache several decades ago. The value of a person's life is not simply a function of the good and bad experiences it contains. More controversially, neither is it simply an aggregate of a person's accomplishments. Discovering another great self-portrait by Rembrandt (who created nearly 100 of them, so far as we know) would not affect to any degree our assessment of his greatness as an artist. Rather, the value of a human life is determined by what adds meaning to life, what – and not simply how much – she achieves, or how well she lived up to her ideals. If this is right, then for most people who live to a reasonable age, living longer will not add value to their lives. The social value of longevity is a question of whether a society in which the median age is higher or human life over time is packaged in fewer individuals is better than a society in which the median age is lower and the same amount of life is packaged in more individuals living shorter lives. I see no reason for thinking the former society is better and hence no justification for nations like the United States or Great Britain to spend health care resources on promoting longevity of its citizens by adding to the normal lifespan.

Douglas MacLean

Title Pending 6216

标题待定 6216

When a misfortune befalls us, it is natural for us to react: “Why me?” This is not just the question: “Why did this unfortunate event occur?” Nor are we simply wondering: “Why do such things happen?” The self-reference implies a comparison we generally manage to keep at the back of our minds: “Why did this happen to me, and not someone else?” Importantly, this is not an expression of idle curiosity. It is an expression of shock, dismay, and disbelief. I am interested in both the moral significance of this natural reaction and the moral significance of our disinclination to acknowledge it. If, as I believe, we are often morally permitted to promote our own interests over the interests of others, if it is our disposition to do so that underlies the “Why me?” reaction, and if we are nonetheless right to think there is something shameful about reacting this way, what does this suggest about the moral significance of our morally permissible self-privileging behavior? How close can we come to reconciling (i) our right to live lives that express very little concern for the fate of others with (ii) an ideal of human solidarity that manifests itself in our self-censuring attitude toward the “Why me?” thought and toward the very self-privileging actions whose moral permissibility we have least reason to challenge?

Sarah Buss

Title Pending 6207

标题待定 6207

This article defends platforms&amp;rsquo; moral responsibility to moderate wrongful speech posted by users. Several duties together ground and shape this responsibility. First, platforms have duties to defend others from harm when they can do so at reasonable cost. Second, platforms have a moral duty to avoid complicity with users&amp;rsquo; wrongfully harmful or dangerous speech. I will argue that one can be complicit in wrongs committed by others by supplying them with a space in which they will foreseeably commit them. For platforms, proactive content moderation is required to avoid such complicity. Further, platforms have an especially stringent complicity-based duty not to amplify users&amp;rsquo; wrongful speech, thereby increasing its harm or danger. Finally, platforms have a duty not to enable new wrongs by amplifying otherwise innocuous speech that becomes wrongfully harmful only through amplification. I close by considering an objection&amp;mdash;that content moderation by platforms constitutes an objectionable form of private censorship&amp;mdash;explaining how it can be answered.

Jeffrey Howard

Title Pending 6195

标题待定 6195

A familiar part of ordinary moral thought is this idea: when other people are doing something worthwhile together, there is a reason for you to join in on the same terms as them. Morality does not tell you that you must always do this; but it exerts some pressure on you to join in. Suppose we take this idea seriously: just how should it be developed and applied? More particularly, just which groups and which actions are the ones with respect to which you have participatory moral reasons? And just when is it wrong not to join in? I present answers to these questions, and discuss the implications—including for joint action on a very large scale, like global efforts to address climate change or fight a pandemic.

Abbreviation
Journal Impact	1.35
Quartiles(Global)	ETHICS(Q3)

Publication Information	Publisher: Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics，Publishing cycle: ，Journal Type: journal，Open Access Journals: Yes
Basic data	Year of publication: 2013，Proportion of original research papers: 100.00%，Self Citation Rate:16.70%， Gold OA Rate: 100.00%
Average review cycle	网友分享经验：52 Weeks

Journal of Practical Ethics

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